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Abstract 
The study of the effects of institutions suffers from a potential endogeneity 
problem. This article proposes a strategy for addressing this problem by 
estimating the motivations for institutional choice directly. It identifies the 
motivations behind the wording of post-independence constitutions in 
Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. We find that constitutional wording in these 
countries has been motivated by the strength of ties with France. However, 
contrary to standard narratives, domestic political preferences have also been 
influential. By estimating the motivations for institutional choice directly, we are 
better placed to draw conclusions about the independent effect of institutions in 
this region. 
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The study of the effects of institutions is long-standing. By contrast, the study of 
institutional choice is much less developed. This is puzzling. The study of 
institutional choice is theoretically prior to the study of the effects of institutions. 
This is because the study of the effects of institutions suffers from a potential 
endogeneity problem. For example, we want to know whether presidentialism 
creates a personalisation of the political system that is dangerous for young 
democracies. However, if a particular person was sufficiently dominant in the 
constitution-making process to insist on the choice of presidentialism and then 
occupied the presidential office after the constitution has been implemented, we 
would have to be careful to ascribe any independent explanatory effect to 
presidentialism if the country then suffered from the problems of personal rule. 
To identify the independent effects of institutions, we need to understand the 
circumstances under which they were chosen in the first place. 
In this article, we propose a two-stage strategy for addressing the problem 
of endogenous institutional choice. The first stage estimates the motivations for 
institutional choice directly. The second stage examines the causal effects of 
institutions in the standard way. In this article, we focus on the first stage of this 
strategy. By including variables that capture both endogenous and exogenous 
motivations, we identify the endogeneity problem directly. If we find that only 
exogenous variables are significant in the estimation, then we are well placed to 
examine the causal effects of institutions in a second-stage study. If we find that 
only endogenous variables are significant, then we would have to doubt the 
extent to which institutions exterted an independent effect. If we find that both 
types of variables are significant, then we can devise a focused research strategy 
to address the endogeneity problem in the second stage of the study. 
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To illustrate this strategy, we examine the wording of post-independence 
constitutions in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. When examining this region, 
there is a standard narrative that France has generally maintained a neo-colonial 
relationship with its former colonies. Moreover, there is an equivalent narrative 
that emphasises the extent to which countries there have often adopted carbon-
copies of the 1958 French constitution. Thus, we would expect to find that the 
wording of these countries’ constitutions has been largely the result of exogenous 
political preferences. When we estimate the motivations for constitutional choice 
directly, what is the evidence to support such an expectation? To answer this 
question, we rely on a unique data set that codes almost every constitutional 
moment in 15 sub-Saharan Francophone African countries for a 50-year period 
from the point of independence in 1960 to 2010. We find that constitutional 
wording in these countries has been motivated in part by exogenous French 
influence. However, contrary to standard narratives, domestic political 
preferences have also been influential. These results suggest that institutions may 
have had an independent causal effect in this region. At the same time, they also 
demonstrate that institutions were chosen at least partly endogenously. By 
identifying specific endogenous motivations, we are well placed to devise a 
focused research strategy that addresses the endogeneity problem in the second 
stage of a research strategy. 
 
The endogenous selection of institutions 
 
Students of political institutions are faced with a dilemma. We assume that 
institutions shape the preferences of political actors. On the basis of this 
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assumption, we wish to identify how actors respond to certain institutional 
arrangements. If we can do so, we can make policy-relevant recommendations as 
to which institutions are likely to generate better governance. At the same time, 
though, we know that institutions are often chosen endogenously. That is to say, 
the individuals or forces who operate under a given institutional system are 
often the ones who chose that system. If individuals choose institutions that 
reflect their pre-existing preferences, when they operate under those same 
institutions their behaviour is not being shaped by them. Instead, institutions are 
inducing behaviour that is consistent with their pre-existing preferences. When 
institutions are endogenously selected, the direction of causation is reversed. 
Institutions are not so much the cause of particular preferences, they are the 
consequence of those preferences. In this case, “institutions have no autonomous 
role to play. Conditions shape institutions and institutions only transmit the 
causal effects of these conditions (Przeworski, 2004, p. 527). 
The problem of the endogenous selection of institutions is well known 
(Aghion et al., 2004; Engerman and Solokoff, 2008; Shvetsova, 2003; Ticchi and 
Vindigni, 2010) and there are a number of strategies for addressing it. The most 
common statistical procedure is the use of an instrumental variable in a two-
stage least squares regression estimation. There are difficulties associated with 
the use of instrumental variables, notably the problem of weak and invalid 
instruments (Murray, 2006, p. 112). There is also the problem that the number of 
instrumental variables in an equation needs to be as great as the number of 
potentially endogenous variables, yet strong and valid instruments are often 
difficult to identify. All the same, if instrumental variables are operationalised 
with care, they can be “extraordinarily useful both as an estimation approach 
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and as a framework for research design” (Sovey and Greene, 2011, p. 199). 
Another strategy is the identification of natural experiments. Again, there are 
limitations to the use of natural experiments. For example, they may suffer from 
the problems of noncompliance, when “places assigned to the treatment group 
go untreated, while places assigned to the control group receive treatment” 
(Gerber and Greene, 2008, p. 367), and attrition, when “outcomes are unobserved 
for certain observations” (ibid., p. 372). Nonetheless, like the use of instrumental 
variables, the use of natural experiments to identify the direction of causality is 
an essential part of the methodological toolkit. 
In this article, we propose a complementary strategy for addressing the 
problem of endogenous institutional choice. We propose a two-stage strategy. 
The first stage estimates the motivations for institutional choice directly. The 
second stage examines the causal effects of institutions in the standard way. In 
this article, we focus on the first stage of this strategy. To estimate the 
motivations for institutional choice directly, we include variables that capture 
both endogenous and exogenous preferences. This strategy allows us to draw 
explicit conclusions about the circumstances under which institutions have been 
adopted. On the basis of such conclusions, we can proceed to a standard analysis 
of the causal effect of institutions, but from a robust platform. For example, if we 
include variables that capture both endogenous and exogenous motivations in an 
equation and we find that only the exogenous variables are significant predictors 
of institutional choice, then we can reasonably assume that institutional choice 
was the result of external influence. Such a result would be the equivalent of a 
first-stage robustness test, indicating that there were good grounds to proceed to 
a standard test of the causal impact of institutions on political outcomes. By 
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contrast, if we include both types of variables in an equation and find that only 
the endogenous variables are significant predictors of institutional choice, then 
we would have to be extremely careful when drawing any conclusions about the 
independent effect of institutions in any subsequent study of the topic under 
consideration. Indeed, such a result might be employed as the equivalent of a 
first-stage robustness test for a scholar who wished to propose a society-centred 
explanation of political outcomes, providing grounds to suggest that the 
independent impact of institutions of political outcomes should be discounted. 
While it is feasible that institutions could be imposed on a country by 
external actors, it is much more likely that even if there is a degree of imposition 
domestic actors will also have at least some influence over the process of 
institutional choice. Equally, even when domestic actors appear to have full 
control over the process of institutional choice, their preferences are likely to be 
shaped to a greater or lesser degree by external interests and ideas. Therefore, 
while institutional choice could be either purely exogenous or endogenous, in all 
likelihood it will be a mix of both. If we estimate the motivations for institutional 
choice directly, we have a strategy for addressing this mix. For example, if an 
equation included both endogenous and exogenous determinants of institutional 
choice and we found that certain endogenous variables were significant, we 
could then choose a case selection strategy that controlled for those variables in 
any subsequent estimation of institutional effects, we could identify specific 
instruments that could be applied to the particular endogenous variable, or we 
could adopt a process-tracing approach (Collier et al., 2004) that would allow us 
to identify the specific impact of the relevant endogenous variables at each stage 
of institutional choice. When institutional choice is the result of a mix of domestic 
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and external preferences, the advantage of estimating the motivations of 
institutional choice directly is that we can identify the specific variables that are 
endogenous to a particular study and then devise a research strategy to account 
for them, allowing us to proceed to the identification of the causal effects of 
institutions more explicitly. 
Overall, we do not wish to argue that this two-stage approach should 
replace strategies that use instrumental variables or natural experiments. We 
merely suggest that estimating the motivations for institutional choice directly 
can provide us with a complementary strategy for addressing the problem of 
institutional endogeneity. As the first stage of a given study, such a strategy can 
confirm whether or not institutions are likely to have had an independent effect 
on political outcomes and also which endogenous variables need to be taken into 
account. In the next section, we provide an example that demonstrates how the 
endogenous and exogenous determinants of institutional choice can be estimated 
directly. 
 
Institutional choice in post-independence francophone sub-Saharan Africa 
 
To what extent is the motivation for institutional choice endogenous or 
exogenous? To answer this question, this article focuses on 15 Francophone sub-
Saharan Africa countries from the point of independence to 2010. They comprise 
the four countries of the former federation of French Equatorial Africa (Central 
African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, and Gabon), the eight countries of 
the former federation of French West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
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Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal), the two former French Mandate 
countries (Cameroon and Togo), and the former French colony of Madagascar. 
There are two reasons for this case selection. The first is that these 
countries have many standard attributes in common. For example, by definition, 
they have a heritage of French colonial rule, including the organisation of the 
colonial economy, bureaucracy, representative institutions and so forth. In 
addition, they are all relatively poor countries economically and they are all also 
highly divided along ethnic lines (Alesina et al. 2003). Also, these countries all 
achieved independence from France within a very short space of time. Guinea 
was the first to do so, being the only country to reject membership of the French 
Community in September 1958. The remaining 14 countries became independent 
at some point in 1960, eight of them in August of that year, by which time the 
French Community was effectively dissolved. Therefore, by examining this set of 
countries and, for example, by excluding any consideration of the former French 
colonies of the Comoros Islands and Djibouti, which became independent only in 
1975 and 1977 respectively, we are controlling for any systematic effect that may 
result from the date of independence.  
The second reason is that there is a strong foundation for the claim that  
institutional choice in this region has been affected by exogenous factors. 
Specifically, France has maintained a very close relationship with countries in 
this region since independence. The standard interpretation of this relationship 
presents it as neo-colonial (Goncharov, 1963; Suret-Canale, 1974; Golan, 1981, p. 
10; Chafer, 2002a, p. 345; Cumming, 2000, p. 360; Gregory, 2000, p. 435; 
Charbonneau, 2008, p. 280; Majumdar and Chafer, 2010, p. 204; Verschave, 1998, 
2000). Even if the term ‘neo-colonial’ is not employed, the relationship between 
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France and its former colonies in sub-Saharan Francophone Africa is often 
considered to be somehow exceptional: 
This is reflected in a number of French expressions used to describe 
Francophone African countries, such as domaine re ́servé (private 
matter), chasse-garde ́e (exclusive hunting ground) or pre-́carré 
(natural preserve), which prescribe the backyard as being ‘off 
limits’ to other great powers (Renou, 2002, p. 6). 
In short, most observers conclude that French influence over its former colonies 
has remained very great since independence. If they are correct, then if we can 
estimate the motivations for institutional choice directly we should find that 
exogenous French factors are associated with institutional outcomes in these 
countries. 
 The foundations of French influence in sub-Saharan Francophone Africa 
are commonly accepted. Four factors are routinely identified. The first is 
economic. Here, France was in a position to obtain scarce natural resources from 
many of its former colonies and establish a market for its own exports. There was 
considerable French investment in the economies of its former colonies, 
corresponding to a form of “rentier-capitalism” (Hugon, 2005, p. 43).i These 
countries had, in practice, a common currency, the CFA franc, that was pegged to 
the French franc and now the euro. The result, Renou (2002, p. 11) argues, was 
that it enabled “France to control Francophone African countries’ money supply, 
their monetary and financial regulations, their banking activities, their credit 
allocation and ultimately, their budgetary and economic policies”. These 
countries were also major recipients of French overseas aid. Formally, this aid 
was not ‘tied’. In reality, though, recipient countries were encouraged to buy 
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French goods and/or to reward French companies with the contracts for 
infrastructure and investment projects. The second factor is military (Luckham, 
1982). France signed defence and security agreements with many of its former 
colonies. In certain countries it had military bases. In these countries and others, 
France was willing to intervene to prevent coups or to support them if they were 
felt to be in the best interests of France (Ayissi, 1999). The level of involvement 
was sporadic but often decisive, with France coming to be known as the gendarme 
(policeman) of Africa. The third factor is cultural. Here, Ager (2005, p. 58) argues, 
“France’s aim was to maintain privileged relations with former colonies, 
amongst other means by ensuring that the French language was used, that 
education was provided in and through French, and that cultural activities 
through the medium of French were available”. Support for the French language 
is the most visible sign of cultural links. However, Joseph (1976, p. 10) 
emphasised the importance of France’s role in education too: “Entire university 
and secondary school systems were supplied, from the physical plant to details 
of curricula, examination systems, teaching materials and personnel regulation”. 
He concludes “French educational models have become more entrenched during 
the expansion of the African educational systems since independence” (ibid.). 
The final factor is personal. French influence was underpinned by a network of 
personal contacts. These went to the highest level, with presidential involvement 
a constant factor in policy making in this region. In addition, it involved the 
influence of particular individuals who were close to the president, notably 
Jacques Foccart under President de Gaulle and President Pompidou, and Guy 
Penne and then Jean-Christophe Mitterrand under President Mitterrand. These 
people enjoyed privileged access to decision-makers in former colonies, but there 
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was also a wider network of officials, experts and advisers who were able to 
transmit France’s interests and values in the region. 
While across the set of writers there is a difference of emphasis as to the 
nature of France’s relationship with its former colonies in sub-Saharan 
Francophone Africa, there is general agreement that France has been, and 
remains, a highly influential actor in the region. Directly or indirectly French 
preferences are believed to have shaped a wide range of policies and, 
consequently, the post-independence histories of the countries in this region. To 
what extent have post-independence Francophone sub-Saharan African 
institutions been the result of domestic or external preferences? The standard 
wisdom suggests that they should have been the result of exogenous French 
preferences. To what extent is this the case? 
 
Constitutional choice in post-independence Francophone sub-Saharan Africa 
 
To identify the extent to which institutions have been chosen endogenously or 
exogenously in this region, we focus on the process of constitutional choice. 
There is a strong basis for this choice. The standard interpretation of 
constitutional choice in post-independence Francophone sub-Saharan Africa is 
well documented. According to this interpretation, at the time of independence 
the countries in this study adopted “carbon copy constitutions” (Davies, 1963, p. 
328) that closely resembled the 1958 French Constitution. This period was 
marked by a process of constitutional “mimetism” (Conac, 1979, p. 8),ii whereby 
the French metropolitan model was transposed onto the African context. For 
some writers, these constitutions were “a set of alien rules” that had usually been 
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written in Europe and were handed down from on high (Mbaku, 2003, p. 112). 
For others, these constitutions were “imposed” but for historical and cultural 
reasons, namely the historically dominant position of France and the political 
culture and experience of the African leaders (Glélé, 1980, p. 33). 
Following this period of seemingly explicit constitutional borrowing, the 
standard interpretation indicates that African countries then started to adopt a 
more indigenous constitutional model. For some observers, this process began in 
the early 1960s when countries started to adopt personalised presidential rule 
and one-party states (Le Vine, 1997, p. 187). For others, the process began in the 
mid-1960s and particularly the 1970s when countries adopted marxist-style 
constitutions. For example, Conac (1979, p. 16) talks of the “Africanisation” of 
constitutions during this period, while Reyntjens (1991, p. 51) identifies “25 years 
of innovations and experiments”. Perhaps unsurprisingly, writers more or less 
explicitly identify domestic political preferences as being responsible for 
changing constitutional choices during this time. So, Glélé (1980, p. 32) argues 
that there was an “acculturation” of the French model, with countries adapting it 
in ways that “responded to their own socio-political and economic realities”. For 
his part, Le Vine (1997, p. 188) provides a host of domestic reasons why the first 
post-colonial constitutions in this region were “so soon left behind, abandoned, 
or abrogated”. 
This situation changed in the early 1990s. At a time when there was a 
wave of democratisation or at least political liberalisation across the world 
generally, most Francophone sub-Saharan Africa adopted new constitutions or 
extensively revised existing ones. For Reyntjens, these countries “again sought 
their inspiration in what they perceive[d] as a reliable and unsuspected 
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democratic model: that of France” (1991, p. 51). Cabanis and Martin (2005, p. 
357) speak of a process of “isomorphism” whereby the constitutions of the 1990s 
“are closer than ever to the model belonging to the former colonial power”. A 
doyen of constitutional studies in this region, Jean du Bois de Gaudusson (2009, 
p. 47), encapsulates the standard wisdom in the following way: “Many basic 
laws adopted at the time of independence were mirror texts of the constitutions 
in operation in the northern hemisphere and more particularly in the former 
colonial powers … [S]omewhat forgotten in the 1970s and 1980s … these [texts] 
were resurgent in the 1990s with the beginning of the process of democratic 
transition”. Thus, external influences are considered to be dominant once again. 
 Thus, identifying the motivations behind constitutional choice in post-
independence sub-Saharan Africa provides an appropriate case for examining 
the extent to which institutions have been chosen endogenously or exogenously. 
While constitutional choice is a matter for sovereign domestic actors, there are 
good reasons to believe that the wording of post-independence constitutions in 
this region may have been largely the result of direct or indirect French 
influence. If this were the case, then we could conclude that constitutions were 
chosen exogenously and, therefore, we would be well placed to determine the 
effect of institutions on post-independence outcomes. 
 
Research design 
 
This study aims to identify and explain the ‘Frenchness’ of post-independence 
Francophone sub-Saharan African constitutions in 15 countries in that region. 
The study covers the period from the point of independence to 2010 inclusive. 
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The observations are country years. If there is a new constitution or if a 
constitutional change occurs part-way through a year, then it is recorded for that 
year only if it occurs before 1 July. Otherwise, all else equal, it is recorded for the 
following year. This point applies to the first observation for each country. If 
independence in 1960 occurred prior to 1 July, then this year is the first recorded 
year. Otherwise, 1961 is the first country year. The first observation for Guinea is 
1959. There is a maximum of 756 observations.  
 The identification of constitutions, constitutional amendments, and 
documents with a constitutional status is always highly contestable. This study 
relies on the definition identified by Elkins et al. (2009, p. 49): 
Constitutions consist of those documents that either: (1) are 
identified explicitly as the Constitution, Fundamental Law, or Basic 
Law of a country; OR (2) contain explicit provisions that establish 
the documents as the highest law, either through entrenchment or 
limits on future law; OR (3) define the basic pattern of authority by 
establishing or suspending an executive branch of government 
(emphasis in the original). 
This definition is operationalised under the heading of the Comparative 
Constitutions Project (CCP).iii The CCP has generated a dataset that identifies new 
constitutions and constitutional amendments for all of the countries and for 
almost of the period under consideration here. Thus, we aimed to gather the text 
of all of the constitutional documents identified in the CCP dataset.iv In addition, 
various constitutional documents were identified that are not recorded in the 
CCP dataset. These documents were included in this study.v The distribution of 
constitutional moments with the various dates is presented in Table 1. Consistent 
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with the Elkins et al. definition, the list includes new constitutions, 
constitutional amendments, constitutional charters, fundamental acts, 
suspensions, and ordinances with constitutional force. Table 1 identifies 219 
constitutional moments in the 15 countries under consideration from the first 
year of independence until 2010 inclusive. Each of the 219 constitutional 
moments has the potential to change the ‘Frenchness’ of a country’s constitution. 
Thus, there is always the potential for the ‘Frenchness’ of constitutions to vary 
from one country to another at any given time. Moreover, even though the 
number of constitutional moments varies across the set of countries, Table 1 
shows that there is also the potential for considerable variation within any given 
country over time. It proved impossible to gather a small number of 
constitutional documents.vi Thus, there are 733 country years in the dataset here. 
 Table 1 about here. 
 The ‘Frenchness’ of any given constitution is measured in the following 
way. Eight words or very short phrases were identified that have consistently 
been present in the French Constitution since 1958. They are listed in Table 2. The 
words or phrases were chosen for four reasons. Firstly, they were only 
introduced into the French constitutional canon in September 1958. The 1958 
constitution was very different from the previous constitution – the Constitution 
of the Fourth Republic.vii The adoption of a substantively new constitution in 1958 
means that if former French colonies have employed the various words or short 
phrases in their post-independence constitutions, then they must have done so 
because they are borrowing from the wording of the 1958 Constitution rather 
than adopting provisions that might be thought of as belonging to a common 
and long-standing constitutional fabric. Therefore, we have the opportunity to 
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determine the extent to which the country’s former colonies explicitly chose to 
adopt constitutional clauses that were new to the French system. Secondly, by 
identifying individual words or very short phrases rather than trying to identify 
the general powers of political actors or institutional structures, we maximise the 
reliability of the coding process. We do not have to make a judgment call as to 
whether a particular actor enjoys a certain power. Instead, we can simply 
identify the presence or absence of specific words or very short phrases. Thirdly, 
we code words or very short phrases rather than, say, presidential or legislative 
powers because such powers would most likely be identifiable in country 
constitutions generally. For example, if we coded whether or not a president 
enjoyed veto power, we would not be capturing the ‘Frenchness’ of a 
constitution. However, when we code the use of the specific word ‘arbitrage’, 
then we can reasonably conclude that there was a French influence on the 
wording of the constitutional text. Fourthly, we avoid ‘common’ verbs, 
prepositions and adjectives. Thus, we minimise the likelihood that countries 
could have routinely chosen the specific terms and maximise the likelihood that 
they have chosen a peculiarly French constitutional term. In these ways, the eight 
words and phrases aim to capture the relative ‘Frenchness’ of any given 
constitution. The lower the level of ‘Frenchness’, the greater the likelihood that a 
constitution was chosen endogenously. The greater the level of ‘Frenchness’, the 
greater the likelihood that the constitution was imported or imposed on the 
country in question. 
If a constitution includes the specified word or phrase, then it is coded 1. If 
it does not, then it is coded 0. Therefore, there is a 9-point scale of ‘Frenchness’, 
ranging from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 8. It should be stressed that the 
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score does not aim to capture whether countries have adopted a French-style 
semi-presidential constitution.viii The chosen phrases do not relate to overarching 
institutional structures. Therefore, whether a country has chosen presidential, 
parliamentary or semi-presidential institutions, it could still generate a score 
between 0-8 on the scale of ‘Frenchness’. It should also be stressed again that the 
score does not measure the power of any particular actor. Apart from the fact 
that many powers are not included in the measure of ‘Frenchness’, a score of 1 is 
recorded even if a different actor from the one identified in the French 
constitution is associated with the particular word or phrase. For example Art. 21 
of the 1958 French Constitution states that the prime minister ‘dirige l’action du 
gouvernement’ (directs the action of the government). In the measure of 
‘Frenchness’ used here, we are interested in whether countries have used the 
phrase ‘dirige l’action du gouvernement’ rather than whether they have ascribed 
this power to the prime minister, the president or any other actor. If they have, 
then whoever the power is ascribed to a score of 1 was still recorded. Finally, a 
score of 1 is only recorded if the exact phrase is found in the constitution. If a 
similar phrase is used, then a score of 0 was recorded. For example, Art. 64 of the 
1958 French constitution employs the term ‘garant de l’inde ́pendance de l'autorite ́ 
judiciaire’. If a former French colony uses a similar but nonetheless different 
phrase such as ‘garant de l’independance des juges’, or ‘garant de l’independance du 
pouvoir judiciaire’, or ‘garant de l’independance de la justice’, then a score of 0 was 
recorded. Table 2 shows that there is variation in the overall frequency of the 
eight indicators across the set of country years. Table 3 provides the basic 
distribution of scores for each country, demonstrating that there is both cross-
country and within-country variation. 
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 Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 The basic aim of this study is to determine the extent to which the 
motivations for constitutional choice have been endogenous or exogenous. To 
identify exogenous preferences, we identify a set of explanatory variables that 
capture potential French influence. A HISTORY variable captures the length of 
time that a country was under direct French colonial rule (including Mandate 
rule). We would expect that the longer a country spent under French colonial 
rule, the more ‘French’ its constitution will be. We use various historical sources 
to identify the duration in years of colonial rule. This variable is time-invariant. 
An AID variable records the percentage of total foreign overseas aid that a 
country receives that comes from France. We would expect that the greater the 
percentage of aid from France, the more ‘French’ the constitution is likely to be. 
We take the annual figures from the OECD Development statistics. An IMPORT 
variable records the percentage of a country’s total imports that come from 
France. If a country is highly dependent of French imports, then we would 
expect France’s influence to be greater and constitutions to be more ‘French’. The 
figures were calculated from the Barbieri et al. (2008) Correlates of War Project 
Trade Data Set (dyadic trade data and national – monadic – trade data). A 
SECURITY variable records the years when there has been a French military 
intervention in a country. This is a dummy variable coded 1 for an intervention 
year and 0 otherwise. We would expect French influence to be greater when 
there is a military intervention. We identify military interventions from the list in 
Charbonneau (2009, pp. 69-73). Finally, a PRES variable captures the personal 
and cultural links between France and its former colonies. We identify whether 
or not the head of state has spent any period of time studying in France and/or 
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whether s/he was a member of the French National Assembly or the upper 
house (then the Council of the Republic) prior to independence in 1960. This is a 
dummy variable coded 1 if the head of state has been educated in France or 
served as a representive to French institutions and 0 otherwise. We would expect 
the ‘Frenchness’ of a constitution to be greater if the head of state has been 
educated in France. 
 To identify endogenous influences we identify a PARTY variable. We 
would expect that the French model is more likely to be adopted when there is 
more competition within the political process. When the process of constitutional 
choice is dominated by a single person or party, then the latitude for 
idiosyncratic constitutional wording is greater. The example of Bokassa’s Central 
African Empire springs immediately to mind. However, when there is 
competition, then there is more likely to be compromise. In this case, parties are 
more likely to stick closely to the democratic model with which they are most 
familiar and the constitution will be more ‘French’ as a result. We take the level 
of political competition from the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland Democracy and 
Dictatorship Revisited dataset.ix This dataset includes an lparty variable, which 
captures party competition in the legislature and is coded 0 when there are no 
parties, 1 when there is one party or one de facto regime party front, and 2 where 
there are multiple parties. We also include a MILITARY variable. This records 
the years when a country was headed by a military leader. We would expect 
military leaders to suspend the full constitution and to rule by decree on the 
basis of a constitutional ordinance. Thus, when there is a military leader, the 
level of ‘Frenchness’ should be low. This is a dummy variable coded 1 in a year 
when there is a military leader and 0 otherwise. The identification of military 
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leaders is taken from the worldstatesmen.org website.x The POP variable 
records the natural log of a country’s population. There is no explicit expectation 
associated with this variable. A country with a small population might be more 
susceptible to French influence. Equally, a country with a large population might 
be more strategically important to France and, therefore, may be the object of 
greater French attention. We take the population statistics from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. Finally, a GDP variable records the natural log of 
a country’s GDP per capita. Again, there is no explicit expectation associated 
with this variable. A country with a low GDP per capita might be more open to 
French influence. Equally, a country with a high GDP might be a more important 
partner for France. We take the GDP per capita figures from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. 
 In addition, we include two time controls. Given the French constitutional 
model was said to be adopted more systematically in the early years of 
independence and in the period following the end of the Cold War, we include 
two dummy variables, a 1960 variable coded 1 for the period up to 1969 inclusive 
and 0 afterwards and a 1990 variable coded 1 for all years from 1991 inclusive 
onwards and 0 beforehand. We expect the degree of ‘Frenchness’ to be greater in 
these periods than otherwise. 
 The research design generates time-series cross-sectional data. We have 
data for 15 separate countries. We employ three estimation techniques. Model 1 
uses panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) with the Prais-Winsten 
transformation (Beck and Katz, 1995). This model is an appropriate way of 
accounting for contemporaneously correlated panels. In this model the 
dependent variable is a continuous variable. Model 2 is an ordered probit 
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regression with country-clustered standard errors. In this model the 
dependent variable is an ordinal variable that can, in theory, range from 0-8. 
However, no country records a score of 8. Moreover, only Benin and Senegal 
record a score of 7 and then for only two years each (1964 and 1965, and 1961 and 
1962 respectively). Therefore, we omit these two observations from Model 2. 
Otherwise, Table 4 shows that the distribution of the dependent variable is 
relatively even. Model 3 is a pooled model with country fixed-effects. Here, the 
dependent variable is continuous. The Hausman test indicates that this model 
should be used rather than a random effects model. In Model 3 the HISTORY 
variable is dropped because it is time-invariant for each country and, therefore, 
would be perfectly collinear with the fixed effect for that country. 
 Table 4 about here 
 
Results and interpretation 
 
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 5. The findings are very 
consistent across the three models. They confirm that the motivations for 
constitutional choice have been both endogenous and exogenous. For the set of 
exogenous factors, four variables (AID, HISTORY, IMPORT, and SECURITY) 
were significant at conventional levels in all three models. However, three of 
these variables (AID, HISTORY, and IMPORT) returned tiny coefficients and the 
finding for the HISTORY variable was in the opposite direction to the one that 
was hypothesised. By contrast, the SECURITY variable had a relatively large 
coefficient and was in the expected direction. In addition, the PRES variable was 
highly significant in Model 1 and was in the expected direction with a large 
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coefficient. Even so, it was not significant in the other two models. For the set 
of endogenous factors, the results were somewhat stronger. In all three Models, 
two variables (PARTY, and MILITARY) were highly significant at conventional 
levels. Moreover, they had relatively large coefficients and were in the 
hypothesised direction. Another variable (POP) returned inconsistent results. It 
was significant in all three models, but there was a positive relationship between 
population and ‘Frenchness’ in two models and a negative relationship in the 
third model. The GDP variable was not significant in any model. In terms of the 
control variables, there was strong support for the 1990 variable. This variable 
was significant, with a large coefficient and in the expected direction in all three 
models. There was somewhat less support for the 1960 variable, which produced 
a similar result in only two of the three models. 
 Table 5 about here 
Various robustness tests were carried out, but are not reported. In place of 
Model 2, an ordered logistic regression was estimated. The results were 
substantively the same as those presented in Table 5. A dummy variable for 
Guinea was also included in Models 1 and 2. Guinea is somewhat unusual 
within the set of former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. It was the only 
country to reject the French Community in 1958 and to vote for independence 
and was spurned by France because of this choice. For its part, Guinea attempted 
to forge an independent set of policies. Overall, we would expect Guinea to have 
a low level of ‘Frenchness’ in its constitutional choices. This expectation was 
strongly supported when Guinea was included in the equation, but the 
substantive results for the other variables were unchanged. An additional 
indicator of ‘Frenchness’ was also included to ensure that the results were not 
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sensitive to the specific choice of indicators. Thus, the presence or absence of 
the term ‘indivisibilité’ in each country’s constitutions was coded. The results 
using the subsequent 10-point scale were substantively the same as those 
reported using the 8-point scale. VIF tests also showed that there is no problem 
of collinearity among the explanatory variables. The highest VIF figure was 2.45 
and the lowest Tolerance figure was 0.41. 
 These results are highly suggestive. They demonstrate that constitutional 
choice was a mix of both endogenous and exogenous motivations. This result is 
interesting because the standard wisdom suggests that external French influence 
has been extremely strong in this region since 1960, implying that institutional 
choice was likely to be mainly exogenous. Certainly, there is evidence that 
French military interventions have had an effect on constitutional wording. 
Presumably, military interventions, whether requested or imposed, have been 
accompanied by the presence of non-military advisers, who have had a direct 
influence on constitutional wording. There is also some support for the idea that 
political leaders with a French education are associated with constitutions that 
are more ‘French’ than those that have been educated purely locally. All the 
same, the impact of endogenous factors is greater than the standard wisdom 
would suggest. Most notably, there is unequivocal support for the idea that party 
competition has increased the ‘Frenchness’ of constitutions, presumably by 
reducing the opportunity for idiosyncratic decision-making and by encouraging 
consensus around constitutional focal points that correspond to the French 
constitution. In short, while there is evidence to suggest that the wording of post-
independence constitutions in this region has been influenced directly or 
indirectly by French influence, there is also evidence to support the claim that 
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post-independence Francophone sub-Saharan African countries have managed 
their own constitutional destinies. They may have done so within a general 
framework of French constitutional law, but they have been willing and able to 
make specific choices that diverge from the precise form of the French model. In 
this event, the standard narrative of overweening French influence since 1960 
needs to be reinterpreted. 
The finding that constitutional choice has been a mix of both endogenous 
and exogenous motivations is consistent with the idea that post-independence 
decision-makers considered themselves to be both French and African, 
generating personalities with a mix of both ‘domestic’ and ‘external’ preferences. 
This idea fits the first generation of post-independence leaders very well. For 
example, the first president of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was a proponent 
of the concept of ‘negritude’, which he defined as “the sum total of the qualities 
possessed by all black men everywhere” (Vaillant, 1990, p. 244), generating a 
very specific life experience. At the same time, Senghor was a former member of 
the French National Assembly, a State Secretary in the French government from 
1955-56, and later a member of Académie française, implying an enduringly close 
relationship with French language, life, and culture. In his work on the end of 
empire, Tony Chafer (2002b, p. 16) has argued that such leaders “saw themselves 
as simultaneously African nationalists and part of a wider French community”. 
To date, such an interpretation has been based on purely qualitative narratives. 
The findings in this article suggest that other research methods might also be 
used to advance such a claim. 
Overall, we must acknowledge that we have only tested for the impact of 
exogenous French influence. In the 1970s it is clear that certain countries were 
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inspired by Soviet-style single-party constitutions. Moreover, since the 
beginning of the 1990s countries have, arguably, been shaped by a more diverse 
set of constitutional influences than merely the French model (Bourgi, 2002, p. 
723). Generally, though, by estimating the motivations for constitutional choice 
directly we are well placed to proceed to a more informed study of the causal 
effect of institutions in this region. The results of the first-stage estimation 
presented above suggests that exogenous motivations were associated with 
institutional choice. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that institutions may 
have had at least some independent causal impact. The precise nature of any 
such impact could now be investigated in the second-stage of a study of post-
independence institutions in this region. At the same time, the results also 
showed that there have been endogenous influences. The second-stage of such a 
study could now focus directly on the impact of the specific endogenous 
variables that were identified. For example, what is the process by which 
increased party competition has generated constitutions that are more ‘French’? 
The second stage of the research project may still need to employ instrumental 
variables, natural experiments and equivalent research strategies, but this stage 
would be more able to proceed in a more focused way because of the first-stage 
estimation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We assume that institutions shape political preferences and have a causal effect 
on political outcomes. However, institutions generally, and constitutions among 
them, are necessarily preference-induced. If institutions are chosen purely 
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endogenously, then we would have to question the extent to which they have 
any independent causal effect. This article has proposed a strategy for addressing 
the issue of endogenous institutional choice. As the first part of a two-stage 
strategy to address the endogeneity problem, this article has directly estimated 
the motivations behind constitutional choice in post-independence Francophone 
sub-Saharan Africa. We find that they were a mix of endogenous and exogenous 
preferences. The finding that constitutional choice was at least partly exogenous 
suggests that we have reason to believe post-independence institutions have had 
at least some causal influence. This result acts as the equivalent of a first-stage 
robustness test for a study of institutions in this region. The finding that 
constitutional choice was also at least partly endogenous suggests that we have 
to take into specific domestic preferences when estimating the independent effect 
of institutions. By identifying particular endogenous influences, we are well 
placed to take account of these motivations in the second stage of a study of 
institutions in this region. By doing so, we will be able to make more reliable 
recommendations about the effects of institutions on political outcomes. 
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Notes
                                                
i All translation from the French are by the author. 
ii All translation from the French are by the author. 
iii See http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/, accessed 25 January 
2011. 
iv The constitutional documents were gathered from a wide variety of sources, 
including the Journal officiel (online and paper copy) of the various countries, 
online sources such as Constitutions du Monde (http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/ 
accessed 25 January, 2011), general sources such as Reyntjens, (1988), journal 
sources such as Année africaine (various years), Revue Juridique et Politique d’Outre-
mer (various years), and Revue Politique et Juridique (Indépendance et Cooperation) 
(various years), as well as country-specific sources such as Fall (2007) and Reynal 
(1994). The CCP dataset ends in 2006. Therefore, amendments from 2007-2010 
inclusive were identified by the author. 
v The additional texts are Cameroon (1983, 1988 and 1991 amendments), Central 
African Republic (1991 and 1992 amendments), Congo (1997 document), Côte 
d’Ivoire (1986 and 1995 amendments), Gabon (1966, 1969, 1972, 1979, 1983, 1986, 
1990, 1995 and 2000 amendments), Guinea (1996 and 2002 amendments), 
Madagascar (1971, 1988, 1989 amendments), Mali (1969 and 1982 amendments 
and the 1991 document), Mauritania (1979, 1981 and 2005 document), Niger 
(2004 amendment), Senegal (1961, 1999, 2003 and 2006 amendments) and Togo 
(1966, 1988 and 2005 amendments). In addition, the CCP dataset records a new 
constitution in Benin in 1979, whereas the constitution was adopted in 
August/September 1977. Also, the CCP dataset records an amendment in 
Mauritania in 1971. There were two amendments in 1970, but none has been 
identified in 1971. Finally, in a small number of cases there is more than one 
constitutional document in the year. If each lasts for more than six months, then 
both are recorded. For example, in the Central African Republic the February 
1981 constitution is recorded for 1981, whereas the September 1981 documents 
are recorded for 1982 onwards. In the CCP dataset, the Central African Republic 
1981 is simply recorded as an “event”, rather than two events. 
vi The following documents and subsequent country years are missing: Benin 
(Dec. 1965 – 1966 and 1967); Cameroon Apr. 1991 – 1991-1995 inclusive); Central 
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African Republic (Sep. 1985 – 1986); Chad (Apr. 1995 – 1995); Congo (1990 – 
1990); Guinea (Apr. 1984 – 1984-1990 inclusive); and Mali (1985 – 1985-1990 
inclusive). 
vii The text of the 1946 Constitution is available at: http://mjp.univ-
perp.fr/france/co1946-0.htm, accessed 18 March 2011. 
 
viii It should be noted, of course, that France only became semi-presidential in 
1962. 
ix The data set is available at:  
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD_page.html, accessed 25 January 
2011. 
x See http://www.worldstatesmen.org, accessed 25 January 2011. 
 Table 1 Constitutional moments in 15 Francophone sub-Saharan African 
countries from independence to 2010 inclusive 
 
Country Total  Dates 
Benin 
 
12 Nov. 1960; Jan. 1964; Dec. 1965; Mar. 1968; May 
1970; Oct. 1972; Nov. 1972; Apr. 1973; May 1973; 
Aug. 1977; Mar. 1984; Aug. 1990 
Burkina Faso 
 
13 Nov. 1960; Jan. 1963; Jan. 1966; Jun. 1970; Feb. 
1974; Dec. 1977; Nov. 1980; Aug. 1983; Mar. 1988; 
Jun. 1991; Jan. 1997; Apr. 2000; Jan. 2002 
Cameroon 
 
14 Mar. 1960; Sep. 1961; Nov. 1969; May 1972; May 
1975; Jun. 1979; Jul. 1983; Nov. 1983; Feb. 1984; 
Mar. 1988; Apr. 1991; Dec. 1991; Jan. 1996; Apr. 
2008 
Central African 
Republic 
 
19 Nov. 1960; Apr. 1961; Dec. 1962; Nov. 1963; Nov. 
1964; Jan. 1966; Dec. 1976; Sep. 1979; Feb. 1981; 
Sep. 1981; Sep. 1985; Nov. 1986; Mar. 1991; Jul. 
1991; Aug. 1992; Dec. 1994; Mar. 2003; Dec. 2004; 
May 2010 
Chad 
 
14 Nov. 1960; Apr. 1962; Nov. 1965; Jul. 1967; Jun. 
1975; Aug. 1978; Aug. 1979; Sep. 1982; Dec. 1989; 
Feb. 1991; Apr. 1993; Apr. 1995; Apr. 1996; Jun. 
2005 
Congo-Brazzaville  14 Mar. 1961; Dec. 1963; Aug. 1968; Dec. 1969; Jun. 
 
 
 1973; Apr. 1977; Jul. 1979; Dec. 1984; 1989; 1990; 
May 1991; Mar. 1992; Oct. 1997; Jan. 2002;  
Côte d’Ivoire 
 
14 Nov. 1960; Jan. 1963; May 1975; Oct. 1975; Sep. 
1980; Oct. 1985; Jan. 1986; Nov. 1990; Aug. 1994; 
Jun. 1995; Jul. 1998; Dec. 1999; Jul. 2000; Dec. 
2004 
Gabon 
 
19 Feb. 1961; Jun. 1966; Dec. 1967; May 1968; Nov. 
1968; Dec. 1969; Jul. 1972; Apr. 1975; Apr. 1979; 
Aug. 1981; Mar. 1983; Sep. 1986; May 1990; Mar. 
1991; Mar. 1994; Sep. 1995; Apr. 1997; Oct. 2000; 
Aug. 2003 
Guinea 
 
8 Nov. 1958; Oct. 1963; May 1982; Apr. 1984; Dec. 
1990; Oct. 1996; May 2002; Apr. 2009 
Madagascar 
 
14 Apr. 1959; Jun. 1960; Jun. 1962; Dec. 1970; 
Nov. 1971; Nov. 1972; Dec. 1975; Dec. 1988; Dec. 
1989; Aug. 1992; Oct. 1995; Apr. 1998; Apr. 2007; 
Mar. 2009 
Mali  
 
13 Jun. 1960; Sep. 1960; Jan. 1961; Nov. 1968; Aug. 
1969; Jun. 1974; May 1979; Sep. 1981; Apr. 1982; 
1985; 1988; Mar. 1991; Feb. 1992 
Mauritania 
 
19 May 1961; Apr. 1964; Feb. 1965; Jul. 1966; Mar. 
1968; Jan. 1969; Apr. 1970; Jun. 1970; Jul. 1978; 
Apr. 1979; Jan. 1980; Dec. 1980; Apr. 1981; Feb. 
1985; Jul. 1991; Aug. 2005; Jul. 2006; Aug. 2008; 
 Jul. 2009 
Niger 
 
13 Nov. 1960; Aug. 1964; Sep. 1965; Apr. 1974; Jan. 
1983; Sep. 1989; Apr. 1991; Dec. 1992; May 1996; 
Jul. 1999; May 2004; Jul. 2009; Feb. 2010 
Senegal 
 
31 Aug. 1960; Nov. 1961; Dec. 1962; Mar. 1963; Jun. 
1967; Mar. 1968; Feb. 1970; Mar. 1976; Apr. 1976; 
Dec. 1978; May 1981; May 1983; May 1984; Feb. 
1991; Apr. 1991; Oct. 1991; Jan. 1992; May 1992; 
Jun. 1994; Mar. 1998; Oct. 1998; Jan. 1999; Jan. 
2001; Jun. 2003; Jan. 2006; Nov. 2006; Feb. 2007; 
May 2007; Aug. 2008; Oct. 2008; Jun. 2009 
Togo 12 Apr. 1960; Apr. 1961; Jan. 1963; May 1963; Dec. 
1966; Jan. 1967; Dec. 1979; May 1988; Oct. 1992; 
Dec. 2002; Feb. 2005; Feb. 2007 
Total 219  
 
 
 
Table 2 Eight indicators of the ‘Frenchness’ of Francophone sub-Saharan 
African constitutions and the total number of times they were 
identified (max. 733) 
 
Article in 1958 
French Constitution 
Text (word or phrase in italics) Total 
Art. 4 … concourent à l’expression du suffrage… 441 
Art. 5 … arbitrage… 144 
Art. 16 … sont menace ́es d'une manie ̀re grave et imme ́diate 
… 
323 
Art. 20 … de ́termine et conduit … 263 
Art. 21 … dirige l’action … 257 
Art. 40 … soit une diminution des ressources publiques, 
soit la cre ́ation ou l’aggravation d'une charge 
publique 
464 
Art. 52 … ne ́gocie et ratifie … 407 
Art. 64 … garant de l’inde ́pendance de l'autorite ́ judiciaire   91 
 
Legend: word/phrase is in bold italics 
Source: 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/constitution/constitution.pdf 
Accessed 25 January 2011 
 Table 3 Descriptive statistics for the ‘Frenchness’ of constitutions in 15 
Francophone sub-Saharan African countries from independence 
to 2010 inclusive 
 
Country (start year) Highest 
(max 8) 
Lowest Average Standard 
deviation 
Benin (1961) 
Burkina Faso (1961) 
Cameroon (1960) 
Central Af. Rep. (1961) 
Chad (1961) 
Congo-Brazzaville (1961) 
Côte d’Ivoire (1961) 
Gabon (1961) 
Guinea (1959) 
Madagascar (1960) 
Mali (1960) 
Mauritania (1961) 
Niger (1961) 
Senegal (1961) 
Togo (1960) 
7 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
6 
3 
5 
5 
5 
6 
7 
6 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
3.02 
3.26 
4.26 
2.63 
4.00 
2.10 
4.92 
3.94 
1.89 
3.16 
3.60 
2.26 
3.70 
3.30 
2.86 
2.51 
2.48 
1.48 
1.55 
2.11 
1.92 
0.57 
1.75 
1.01 
1.27 
1.36 
2.15 
2.46 
0.84 
1.87 
 
 
 
Table 4 The distribution of the dependent variable 
 
Score Frequency Percentage 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
  90 
  91 
  61 
146 
  73 
189 
  79 
    4 
    0 
12.28 
12.41 
  8.32 
19.92 
  9.96 
25.78 
10.78 
  0.55 
  0.00 
 
 Table 5 Factors affecting constitutional choice in 15 Francophone sub-
Saharan African countries 
 
Explanatory 
variable 
 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(panel-corrected 
standard errors) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(country-
clustered 
standard errors) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(country-
clustered 
standard errors) 
History -0.01 
     (0.00)*** 
-0.01 
     (0.00)*** 
 
Aid 0.00 
   (0.00)** 
0.01 
  (0.00)* 
0.01 
     (0.00)*** 
Import 0.00 
 (0.00)* 
0.00 
   (0.00)** 
0.00 
  (0.00)* 
Security 0.22 
   (0.10)** 
0.67 
     (0.20)*** 
0.42 
     (0.16)*** 
Pres 0.40 
     (0.16)*** 
-0.35 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
Party 0.60 
     (0.10)*** 
0.81 
    (0.21)*** 
1.05 
     (0.09)*** 
Military -1.67 
     (0.14)*** 
-0.99 
   (0.43)** 
-0.96 
     (0.15)*** 
Pop 0.40 
    (0.17)** 
0.59 
     (0.18)*** 
-1.30 
     (0.31)*** 
 
 
GDP 0.23 
(0.18) 
0.31 
(0.27) 
0.11 
 (0.26) 
1960 0.38 
    (0.17)** 
0.69 
   (0.33)** 
0.20 
(0.18) 
1990 0.97 
    (0.17)*** 
0.58 
(0.36) 
1.74 
     (0.21)*** 
Constant -2.09 
 (2.33) 
 11.32 
     (3.27)*** 
    
N= 618 616 618 
No. of 
panels/countries 
15 15 15 
R2 49.4 24.0 26.0 
Wald Chi2 443.41 494.72  
 
* significant at p < 0.1, ** significant at p < 0.05, *** significant at p < 0.01 
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